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 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The PRISMS project analyses the traditional trade-off model between security and privacy 
and devises a more evidence-based perspective for reconciling security, privacy and trust. It 
examines how technologies aimed at enhancing security are subjecting citizens to an increas-
ing amount of security measures and, in many cases, causing infringements of privacy and 
fundamental rights. It conducts both a multidisciplinary inquiry into the concepts of security 
and privacy and their relationships and a EU-wide survey to determine whether or not people 
evaluate the introduction of security technologies in terms of a trade-off. As a result, the pro-
ject determines the factors that affect the public assessment of the security and privacy impli-
cations of a given security technology. The project has used these results to devise a decision 
support system providing users (those who deploy and operate security systems) insight into 
the pros and cons, constraints and limits of specific security investments compared to alterna-
tives taking into account a wider society context.  
 
The criminological work package (WP4) included within PRISMS aims to contribute in two 
significant ways to the general remit of the overall project. As outlined in deliverable 4.1, the 
first goal was to arrive to a formulation of a conceptualisation of the notions of security and 
privacy from a criminological perspective that could be and were used to provide input for the 
development of the survey, its concepts, questions and hypotheses. The second objective of 
WP4 was the contextualisation of the results of the survey in light of a qualitative research 
case study conducted at Brussels airport, in order to further feed with its insights the devel-
opment of the decision support system, one of the final outcomes of the project. The latter is 
what is detailed in the present deliverable. 
 
The main goal of the second research task of WP4 is to explore citizens’ attitudes and evalua-
tions of security. This means that our leading question is: How do people experience security-
privacy practices or situations? To get insight people’s experiences with security practices we 
can only rely on how people frame and account (narrate) these experiences and events. Ac-
counts or narratives are tools that individuals use in a sort of radical reflexivity connecting 
actions and accounts.1  As announced in the work package description, a qualitative case 
study can precisely focus on the analysis of accounts or narratives concerning the experience 
of participants of security practices. That way we can access how participants make sense of 
the situation they are part of.  
 
This deliverable is structured as follows: first, we will discuss the Brussels airport case study 
afterwards, we will shortly evoke the normative framework for aviation security in place be-
fore and after 9/11; then we will very briefly describe the governance of this field, with par-
ticular emphasis on the Belgian case. Finally, we will present the main empirical findings of 
our qualitative study, which will be used as the basis for the conclusions advanced in the final 
section of the report.  
                                                
1 von Lehn, Dirk, Harold Garfinkel: The Creation and Development of Ethnomethodology, Left Coast Press, 
Walnut Creek, CA, 2014. 
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 2 A QUALITATIVE CASE STUDY OF THE (BRUSSELS) AIRPORT 
 
The airport site was chosen for the PRISMS qualitative case study because it is a well-defined 
area in which security and privacy play an important role, both in terms of discourses and 
narratives, of practices and attitudes, and one with which an increasing number of people are 
familiar. The air travel and airports are situations in which the security-privacy trade-off is 
strongly embedded.2 It is one of the more telling examples were the security discourse and 
practices have been developed increasingly, since 9/11/2001. These security practices have 
been implemented with an impressive breaching of the privacy of passengers. And they have 
been legitimated by a trade-off discourse since their first introduction. Such is the power of 
the now prevailing security discourse that the memory of a time where airport control consist-
ed merely of border control – that is, when only the identity of the passenger was checked 
against valid proof of ID – has been, to all extent and purposes, erased.  
 
Today, airport security practices are diverse, multilayered and interconnected. Airports can be 
understood as sites of institutionalised mobility and transit, complexified by being a “multi-
faceted environment dominated by doctrines of risk management and customer services, 
(where) the confessionary complex facilitates the self-policing of transiting individuals, and 
(…) the overlapping and obscured lines of authority subtly restrict the possibilities of re-
sistance”3. Salter’s approach makes clear the relevance of an airport case-study for PRISMS, 
as it is in the airport – specifically when going through security – that passengers have to face 
and participate in security practices, legitimated directly by the security-privacy trade-off.  
 
The choice for Brussels airport as case study for WP4.2 of PRISMS must be understood in 
this perspective. The PRISMS project, and the criminological WP in particular, intend to re-
search empirically, if so, whether and how people actually evaluate security practices in terms 
of a trade-off between security and privacy. Not what it should be, but rather how it is embed-
ded in everyday practices and situations. How are these situations and practices perceived, 
experienced and evaluated? In other words, what kind of meaning these situations get? There-
fore, what matters is that we come to understand how individuals experience security practic-
es and how their evaluations can be understood in this process.  
 
The empirical research we have set up at Brussels airport connects to these questions. There-
fore, we opted to focus on a very specific moment in the security governance and policing of 
airport passengers, notably the security screening of passengers and hand luggage before ar-
riving at the flight gate. This specific situation remains one of the few situations where flight 
passengers (citizens) experience security practices in a very  practical, common and direct 
way. This situation is one of the few examples in which a tangible encounter and interaction 
between on one hand agents enforcing and performing airport security and on the other hand 
passengers, can be practically observed.  
 
The central aim of this empirical approach is to acquire insight and shed light on the notions 
of security and privacy that people develop in practice while they are at the airport and pass-
ing through security checks.  Therefore, our research task sought to investigate: how people 
experience security (checks), in which terms they understand their participation in the screen-
                                                
2 Adey, Peter, "Secured and Sorted Mobilities: Examples from the Airport", Surveillance & Society, Vol. 1, No. 
4, 2004, pp. 500-519. Salter, Mark B., "Governmentalities of an airport: Heterotopia and confession", 
International Political Sociology, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2007, pp. 49-66. 
3 Salter, 2007, [p. 47]. See also Scherrer, Amandine, Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet and Didier Bigo (eds.), Mobilités 
sous surveillance, perspectives croisée UE-Canada, Athéna Editions, Outremont, 2009. 
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 ing process and how do they relate to screeners and or to passengers?  We approach the air-
port security screening of passengers as an interactional situation with different participants 
(screeners or security agents, supervisors, camera’s, passengers, etc). It is important to stress 
that from an ethnographical perspective all these participants are part of what airport security 
screening of passengers is.4 Therefore, we analyse peoples’ behaviour and narratives on their 
experience with this very specific and limited situation. Methodologically this means that 
apart from non participant observations of the screening practices in Brussels airport we not 
only carried out interviews with passengers, but we also turned to the screeners themselves 
and their narratives of “doing security screenings”. People working the line of passengers 
security checks are interacting with passengers and have their own experience of how passen-
gers react and interact within the security check practice. We were especially interested in 
how these employees describe this situation, how they feel about specific security practices 
involved and how they see and experience conflicts that may emerge. Focusing on these con-
flicts is relevant for our study, because they can be characterised as moments where the limits 
of dominance are tested and become “public” or visible.5 These conflicts show that even 
where at first glance there is complete submission to the security practices, another (hidden) 
discourse or narrative exists. This resistance can be observed in small forms of behaviour, 
described as forms of infrapolitics.6  
 
                                                
4 von Lehn, 2014. 
5 Scott, James C., Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1990. 
6 Ibid. 
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 3 THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11 
 
The Chicago Convention of 1944 established the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(hereafter: ICAO), a specialized United Nations agency responsible for the regulation and 
coordination of international air travel. Among its tasks falls the development of common 
standards and practices in the field of civil aviation, which are outlined in a series of Annexes 
to the original convention and cover a variety of matters, from the licensing of personnel to 
the marking of aircrafts and the units of measurement whose use is authorised. Within the 
scope of this deliverable, of particular relevance is Annex 17, Security Safeguarding Interna-
tional Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference, which details a series of common 
security standards to be implemented by all member states for the protection of passengers, 
crew, infrastructures and aircrafts from terrorist attacks. First adopted on 22 March 1974, the 
Annex has so far been amended 13 times, with the latest version being released in June 2013. 
While the specific contents of the Annex are restricted, it is nevertheless possible to make a 
few points about the historical evolution of international security standards in the field of civil 
aviation.  
 
It is clear to the eye of the contemporary reader how all the international Conventions on air 
travel tackling the topic of aviation security (Tokyo, signed 1963, effective 1969; The Hague, 
signed 1970, effective 1971; Montreal, 1971, effective 1973; Protocol to the Montreal Con-
vention, signed 1988, effective 1989) are focused on one very specific type of threat – the 
hijacking of planes –, on how to manage those, and on the sanctions against individuals and 
groups involved in their planning and execution. With peaks in the 1960s and the 1970s, in 
fact, this was a common tactic deployed by terrorist groups, so much so that in those years the 
so called 'Common Strategy' came to be developed by the US Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, instructing crew members to comply with the hijackers' requests and passengers to re-
main inactive in order to increase their chances of survival. This strategy basically remained 
unchanged until 9/11 and was only shelved when suicide hijackers came onto the internation-
al scene.  
 
The landscape in which these Conventions were drafted was also radically different from to-
day's; despite the emphasis on the need for stronger international cooperation, aviation securi-
ty was at the time very much a national affair. In Europe, responsibility for implementing ap-
propriate measures fell with member states of what was then called the European Community, 
and civil servants were carrying out the checks in airports in a majority of cases. While this 
progressively changed due in no small parts to efforts towards the liberalisation and integra-
tion into a single European market made by the EU of the distinct national markets for air 
travel, and the decrease in cost and increase in traffic that resulted from those, along with the 
appearance of new carriers – notably, low cost airlines – a common EU-wide framework for 
aviation security only emerged in the wake of the 9/11 events. This means that, while there 
was an expectation that the measures outlined in the various international conventions would 
be implemented by all signatory states, it was left to single members to decide how to do that.  
 
 
3.1 LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR AVIATION SECURITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AFTER 
9/11 
 
The events of 9/11 sparked a radical rearrangement of the field of aviation security, with the 
EU legislator recognising, and addressing, the need to establish common rules for safeguard-
ing civil aviation. Such efforts initially resulted in regulation EC 2320/2002, which introduced 
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 a first common set of security measures to be adopted in all European airports. In the light of 
the knowledge gained in the intervening years, that regulation was repealed in 2008 and re-
placed with regulation EC 300/2008, which simplified, harmonised and clarified the existing 
rules on aviation security as laid out in regulation EC 2320/2002. Taken together with regula-
tion EU 18/2010, regulation EU 185/2010 and regulation EU 1411/2011, these legislative acts 
represent the binding legal framework for matters pertaining to the security of civil aviation 
operations in the EU countries, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.  
 
The ultimate goal of this regulatory framework is twofold; it aims at the establishment of 
common security rules for civil aviation, along with the creation of appropriate mechanisms 
to monitor compliance. In order to do this, Member States had to designate a single authority 
as the body responsible for the implementation of common security standards, while at the 
same time develop two national programmes: a national civil aviation security programme to 
'define responsibilities for the implementation of the common basic standards on aviation se-
curity' (regulation EC 300/2008, recital 13), and a national quality control programme to mon-
itor compliance with relevant legislation. Significantly, the regulation also acknowledges the 
possibility of derogations to common rules, introduced by member states in light of risk as-
sessment analyses, or on the back of considerations on factors such as 'the size of the aircraft, 
the nature of the operation and/or the frequency of operations at airports' (regulation EC 
300/2008, recital 9). In case the measures introduced on the back of a risk analysis are more 
stringent than those commonly adopted throughout the EU, these must be relevant, objective, 
non-discriminatory and proportional to the risk that was assessed.  
 
Other relevant actors – specifically: airports, air carriers and all other entities involved in the 
provision of services to airports – must also develop their own security programmes (these are 
respectively: airport security programme, air carrier security programme, entity security pro-
gramme), detailing the methods and procedures to be used in order to guarantee compliance 
with EU legislation and the appropriate national security programmes.  
 
Within the scope of the present deliverable and in light of the fieldwork that was carried out at 
Brussels airport, the specific provisions regarding the screening of passengers and of cabin 
baggage and the characteristics of the security equipment to be used to this end – as laid out in 
regulation EU 185/2010 – are particularly relevant. Passengers can either be screened by hand 
search or made to pass through a “walk through metal detector” (WTMD). Manual body 
searches must be performed “so as to reasonably ensure that the person is not carrying pro-
hibited items” (regulation EU 185/2010, attachment 3-B, article 4.1.1.3. Emphasis not in orig-
inal.), while hand-held metal detectors (HHMD) can only be used as a supplementary means 
of screening. Jackets and coats must be taken off before undergoing security control. Cabin 
baggage can be manually searched by a security agent, go through an x-ray machine or be 
screened with explosive detection system (EDS7) equipment. As is the case for passenger 
screening, “all alarms shall be resolved to the satisfaction of the screener so as to reasonably 
ensure that no prohibited articles are carried into the SRA [security restricted area] or on 
board an aircraft” (regulation EU 185/2010, attachment 3-B, article 4.1.2.6. Emphasis not in 
original). Laptops, tablets and other large electrical items must be removed from the baggage 
and screened separately, as is the case for liquids, gels and aerosols (LAGs). Explosive detec-
tion dogs and explosive trace detection (ETD) can only be used as an additional means of 
screening. LAGs might also be screened by means of chemical reaction test strips or bottled 
                                                
7	   Explosive	   detection	   systems	   (EDS)	   employ	   x-­‐ray	   technology,	   while	   explosive	   trace	   detection	   systems	   (ETD)	   detect	   the	  
chemical	  traces	  left	  by	  particles	  of	  explosive	  materials,	  usually	  by	  rubbing	  a	  wand	  onto	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  object	  to	  be	  test-­‐
ed.	  
Deliverable 4.2
9
 liquid scanners. “Tasting and testing on the skin may be used as a supplementary means of 
screening” (regulation EU 185/2010, attachment 3-B, article 4.1.3.2).  
 
Security scanners (the so-called body scanners in common parlance) were added to the list of 
the methods available to perform passengers screening with regulation EU 1411/2011. Signif-
icantly, this document openly references the privacy implications of the technology and pro-
vides passengers with the right of opting-out of this specific means of screening in favour of 
alternative methods. At the same time, it also identifies explicitly the use of security scanners 
based on automated threat detection (“so that it is no longer necessary for any human review-
er to analyse images”. Regulation EU 1411/2001, recital 8) as a goal the Commission will 
strive to implement in European airports. Currently, security scanners are not in use at Brus-
sels airport.  
 
 
3.2 BRUSSELS AIRPORT: THE GOVERNANCE OF AVIATION SECURITY 
 
The designated national authority for Belgium is the Belgian Civil Aviation Authority (FR: 
Direction Générale Transport Aérien, NL: Directoraat-Generaal Luchtvaart. Hereafter: 
BCAA). 
 
 
Figure 1: Security actors at Brussels airport. 
Before 1999 Brussels airport was owned by the Belgian state and airport police forces were in 
charge of public order, security control and access control. After 1999 Brussels airport be-
came a privately run company, with a participation of 25% by the Belgian State. The 1999 
law8 and afterwards the 2001 Belgian police reform of had an important impact on the organi-
sation and involvement of public police forces in airport activities and security. Today the 
airport police is part of the federal police and organised under the Directorate of Airport Po-
                                                
8 Wet	  tot	  regeling	  van	  de	  bevoegdheidsverdeling	  ingevolge	  de	  integratie	  van	  de	  zeevaartpolitie,	  de	   luchtvaartpolitie	  en	   de	   spoorwegpolitie	   in	   de	   federale	   politie,	   3th	   of	   May	   1999.	   (B.S.	   3-­‐5-­‐1999).	  http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=nl&la=N&cn=1999050330&table_name=wet 
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 lice9. After 9/11 the privatisation of airport security activities expands: in 2011 G4S (security 
company) becomes the security subcontractor at Brussels airport. The company provides ser-
vices concentrating on passengers screening, luggage screening, vehicle screening and access 
control. The security division of Brussels Airport Company has two main tasks; on one hand, 
they audit everything that is related to security within the boundaries of the airport, while on 
the other they are responsible for the training of chief security inspectors. In terms of auditing, 
most of the efforts are directed at making sure that the overall levels of security are satisfacto-
ry and that the quality of the service provided by the subcontractor G4S is always up to the 
agreed standard and fully compliant with EU legislation. Today the security division of Brus-
sels Airport Company comprises senior staff, which are former state employees and were part 
of the former airport police. As made clear in interviews with the staff, they do not employ 
people who ever worked for the private security company.  
 
                                                
9 http://www.polfed-­‐fedpol.be/org/org_dga_lpa_en.php 
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 4 IMPOSING AND UNDERGOING PASSENGERS’ AIRPORT SECURITY 
CHECKS 
 
 
4.1 CONTEXT OF RESEARCH, METHODOLOGY AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
 
Brussels airport is the largest airport in Belgium, with around 219000 registered movements 
(take offs and landings) in 2013. More then 80 % concerns passenger flights, 84% of which 
directed towards other European countries. The vast majority of the 19 million passengers 
(per year) going through the airport are from Europe (74.8 % vs 25.2 %), with 17% of the 
total amount using Brussels as transit.10 Being based in Brussels ourselves and having good 
and long established contacts with the field of private policing and the airport security divi-
sion through the Department of Criminology of the VUB (in particular through the network of 
Prof. M. Cools), we opted for Brussels airport. This enhanced our possibilities of access and 
cooperation enabling the fieldwork. Given the security implications of the fieldwork, it was 
indeed first necessary for the researchers to obtain formal access to the passengers’ security 
check. The formal procedure of access permission took several months, consisting of a two-
step procedure. First the involved researchers (Menichelli and Christiaens) where subjected to 
a security background check, which involved verifying police and criminal records in order to 
check whether they met the security characteristics and conditions necessary to be issued an 
airport badge. It remains somewhat unclear up until where this “security clearance” reaches. 
Before the badge was issued, just like all personnel working the Brussels airport, we had 
view/screen a special Brussels airport security instruction documentary. It was an interesting 
experience to witness this situation. As a researcher sitting in a small visioning room together 
with regular personnel of Brussels airport, watching an instruction movie that aims at increas-
ing security awareness in the airport context. Going back to the 1988 Lockerbie case and of 
course the 9/11 disaster the instruction documentary explains roughly the security organisa-
tion of the airport. All personnel is called to be part of and or participating in watching for 
suspicious activities, persons or objects. As an part of the research it was for us an interesting 
illustration of the security narrative that underpins all airport security. However present (regu-
lar) personnel were clearly uninterested. Watching this information and awareness movie be-
comes a routine; it must be done each time the access badge expires.  
 
Once the badge was issued, it was possible for the researchers to access restricted areas within 
the airport, and to conduct the non-participant observations as well as doing interviews with 
passengers and screeners.  
 
We decided to focus on the security screening lines of passengers (and their hand luggage). 
This specific “situation” is located between the “border” (customs) and the actual gates to the 
airplane. In Brussels airport there are two “piers” or gates areas. In the “Schengen” area (Pier 
A) there is no border check (anymore), passengers go directly from check-in (only digital 
check of the boarding pass) to the security screening lanes. Once passed through this screen-
ing they arrive in the so-called tax free and commercial area, which leads to the actual (A) 
gates. Passengers flying outside the Schengen area go, after check-in, through customs with 
passport and boarding pass control. After the “border” passengers arrive in a first commercial 
area. When going to the gates they will first have to pass the security check (of themselves 
and their hand luggage), arriving afterwards in the second commercial area leading to the 
gates. At the gates another “check” of the passengers’ ticket and passport is done. When fly-
                                                
10 Brussels Airport Company, "BRUtrends 2013", 2013. 
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 ing to the US a second security check of passengers and hand luggage is (possibly – ad ran-
dom) operated before really entering the “gate area”.  
 
Observations were carried out at the security lanes (Pier A and B) during the months of April 
and May 2014. It was initially planned that observations would be conducted at different 
times during the day throughout the week, so as to obtain a full picture of security controls at 
various moments. However, it soon became obvious that the very specific patterns of air traf-
fic in Brussels airport would have to be taken into account, which led to a change in the tim-
ing, duration and choice of location of the observations. First, because of the presence of Eu-
ropean and international institutions and all the organisations that revolve around them, most 
of the inbound passenger traffic is concentrated between Sunday evening and Monday morn-
ing, while outbound traffic reaches its peak between Thursday evening and Friday. Second, 
because the vast majority of flights have Schengen destinations (64.1% of commercial 
flights), most of the traffic goes through Pier A (Schengen area). Therefore, while observa-
tions were also conducted at Pier B, where non-Schengen flights are directed, and at different 
times during the week, minimal traffic was observed then, so most of the observations were 
conducted at Pier A on Mondays, Thursdays and Fridays. In total, the researchers spent 18 
hours at the security lanes (Pier A). Observations (20 hours) were also conducted at Pier B 
(non-Schengen) in the same period as interviews were organised with screeners in the G4S 
room for personnel located at the Pier B.  
 
In addition to the observations, interviews were conducted. First, we did some more explora-
tory interviews with (management) personnel from both Brussels airport company and G4S, 
the security contractor, including the market research manager and the auditor internal quality 
control & security instructor from Brussels airport company, the service centre manager and 
the aviation manager from G4S. These interviews were necessary for understanding the or-
ganisation of security practices in Brussels airport and more specifically the situation of pas-
senger’s control. In total, 4 of these interviews were conducted. All were recorded and tran-
scribed.  
 
After that, interviews with passenger were conducted. Initial attempts saw interviewing di-
rectly at the gates, with people waiting for their flight. However, it soon became evident that 
due to the noise, passengers wanting to go to the gate, and language barriers this was far from 
an ideal location. As a result, it was decided to move the interviews outside the airport, with 
people familiar with Brussels airport and who fly frequently, as it was believed that their wid-
er experience of air travel in general and security in particular would make them more useful 
respondents. Eventually, 12 interviews, 8 with female respondents and 4 with male respond-
ents, were conducted, ranging in length from 10 to 20 minutes, with people from Belgium, 
Italy, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom. All were recorded and transcribed. At the 
same time, interviews with the screeners were conducted. These interviews were mainly con-
ducted in a backroom for G4S personnel at Pier B. Interviewees were selected from the 
screening lines at Pier B. However, all personnel have experience in working at both Piers (A 
& B). We conducted 13 interviews, with 7 male and 6 female screeners, with a variety of age 
and working experience. These interviews were all done in Dutch (and one in French). Inter-
views, ranging in length from 15 to 30 minutes, were recorded and transcribed.  
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  gender age 
Years working in  
G4S as screeners Position 
respo 1 F 35 3 team leader 
respo 2 M 29 5 screener 
respo 3 M 32 12 team leader 
respo 4 M 24 3 mentor 
respo 5 F 24 1 screener 
respo 6 F 26 2 screener 
respo 7 M 26 2 screener 
respo 8 M 28 4 screener 
respo 9 M 32 5 screener 
respo 10 F 39 5 screener 
respo 11 M 57 6 screener 
respo 12 M 28 8 screener 
respo 13 F 36 7 screener 
Table 1: Sample composition 
 
Doing fieldwork in an airport is not self-evident and has some implications that should be 
taken into account. First, the necessity to negotiate access both to the site and to the respond-
ents meant that everything had to be agreed upon with airport management. This is not to say 
that the companies were uncooperative, as it was clear from the initial meetings that they were 
interested in the results that the research might produce and were consequently willing to fa-
cilitate the researchers’ work. However, they were still able to exert a degree of control over 
the transmission of relevant data, for example concerning the complaints filed by passengers. 
At the same time, we depended on their organisation to make screeners available for inter-
viewing. That way in fact they selected our respondents.  
 
While this is not in any way different from carrying out research in any context or organisa-
tion where access needs to be negotiated with gatekeepers, specific characteristics of the air-
port heavily influenced how the fieldwork was conducted and the kind of results that were 
eventually produced. On one hand, the airport is a site that occupies a separate domain from 
everyday life, with the difference marked physically (by fences and barriers), pragmatically 
(with specific rites that passengers have to go through in order to be able to board their flight 
and rules to be followed) and discursively (with great emphasis placed on the necessity for 
security).  
 
On the other hand, the decision to study the moment when security is made in the interaction 
between screener and passenger had to take into account the obvious power differentials that 
characterise relationships between the two parties. Two results from the fieldwork illustrate 
this point. When in the interviews passengers were asked whether they would be comfortable 
in speaking up to a screener if they felt they were somehow being mistreated, half of them 
said they were not so sure they would. Interviewees feared that being perceived as trouble-
some would eventually prevent them from being able to board their flight. In much the same 
way, during the time spent at security control, there were no instances of passengers protest-
ing, with people never going much further than muttering something to themselves and 
shrugging it off with a resigned look on their faces.  
 
It became clear that the interviews with both passengers and screeners would be far more rel-
evant for this case-study than lengthy observations. Beyond the explorative observations, in-
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 terviews were better suited to understand how people make sense of their participation in the 
making of security at the lane, as opposed to the fleeting interactions that take place there. 
Coupling passengers’ interviews with the conversations that the researchers had with the 
screeners made it possible to record how both parties perceive, experience and negotiate their 
involvement in the interaction, and to compare and contrast these rationalisations in order to 
identify the dynamics and the strategies each side deployed during security checks. Moreover, 
during the interviews with passengers and screeners attention was focused on where people 
would draw the line in terms of their participation and submission to security controls. An 
important focus of our fieldwork were possible conflicts emerging when doing passengers 
security screening. This focus on what could be called the limits of submission to security 
practices is linked to the idea that this could offer meaningful insight for our understanding of 
how citizens experience and evaluate these situations (with a radical trade off).  
 
For readers’ clarity, excerpts from interviews or field notes from the observations will be in 
italics throughout the text. Also, when related to the screeners (4.3), these excerpts are transla-
tions of interviews in Dutch (Flemish) and French made by the researchers: some of the for-
mulations may sound awkward in English, but rather than to formalise or try to find the 
equivalent tone in English, we have opted for a more or less literal rendering of their words in 
English, because we think that, even if the expressions do not even exist in English as such, 
they speak for themselves.  
 
 
4.2 UNDERGOING SECURITY CHECK 
In the course of the interviews with passengers, several themes recurred, revolving around four distinct 
concepts; ‘necessity’, ‘efficacy’, ‘proportionality’ and ‘privacy’. Each will be analysed in greater de-
tail, with quotes.  
 
4.2.1 Necessary, but efficient 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, all interviewees agreed, though to varied degrees, that airport security 
is a necessity nowadays in the light of attacks carried out against civil aviation. The normali-
zation of exceptional measures of control has been so successful that security is now consid-
ered just another part of the game: if you want to board a flight, this is something you have to 
go through.  
 
I always feel like those measures have some sort of reason. That’s my idea. I just put 
up with them. I think someone in the past has used something that looks like a water 
bottle to commit a crime, so I’ll just throw my water bottle out. It’s not super incon-
venient. (…) I trust the people who decide on the rules, so I don’t think it’s up to me 
decide what is safe, what is not safe. So if it’s in my interest to follow the rules, I just 
will. (Interviewee 2) 
I agree and I accept and I totally agree that we have to protect ourselves against all 
kinds of single men or terrorist attacks, that it is necessary for all air travel to be as 
safe as possible, so I understand that this is a pain we have to go through, but it’s 
sometimes very frustrating. But it’s necessary. The security is necessary, I guess. (In-
terviewee 1) 
Security regulations have become really a burden for passengers that travel very of-
ten. At the same time, I see the reasons behind and in a way I accept and I agree fully 
as they stand now. (Interviewee 3) 
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 There’s probably a need [for security regulations] but I don’t know to what extent 
what they are doing today is actually covering security and how much it is not. I’ll 
come back to the water thing. I am not sure that not taking water on board can pre-
vent whatever. (Interviewee 4) 
Thinking about security control in terms of necessity implies considerations about its efficien-
cy. If the process itself cannot be avoided, then at least it should be made as easy and hassle-
free as possible to go through it. Not wasting time is, to some interviewees, the number one 
concern they have when they have to catch a flight.  
 
I make sure that no item will cause the intervention of the manual screeners as op-
posed to the magnetic one [interviewee is referring to WTMD]. I try to make sure that 
I don’t lose any extra time because of that. It’s just a time issue. (…) As far as my per-
sonal travel is concerned, efficiency is my main concern, but I understand that certain 
procedures are necessary for additional security. (Interviewee 3) 
- I don’t want to lose time, so if I’m in a hurry I don’t want to be stopped for stupid 
reasons.  
- What is a stupid reason? 
- If they make a mistake, because they think that there’s something that it’s not right, 
but mostly it’s a mistake of the personnel or the machines. (Interviewee 5) 
 
Under this light, technology comes to play a relevant role, as it is seen as something that can 
eliminate the need for human screeners, thus making the entire process faster and, at the same 
time, less vulnerable to errors.  
 
- If the right technology was available, it would be great. Just putting your hand lug-
gage on the belt, without having to take out laptops and liquids and then again, having 
the right technology, not having to take out all of your items, such as watches and 
belts and so on and just go through it. A screening that even if more thorough would 
allow me not to have to go through the process of having to take all items outside my 
pockets. 
- So would you support the introduction of body scanners, for example? 
- Yes, I would. But even with current body scanners you still have to take out the items. 
So in a way, as they are now, they do not really change the burden the passenger goes 
through, it’s just more accurate and more precise. But you still have to take out your 
watch and your belt and so on. So in this sense there is no real benefit apart from se-
curity for the passenger. (Interviewee 3) 
 
4.2.2 Efficacy and the need for more information 
 
In spite of the acceptance of security control, the concurrent theme of ‘efficacy’ emerged from 
the interviews, with interviewees expressing uncertainty as to whether, in their current state, 
regulations actually guarantee and increase security. Doubts revolve around two main ques-
tions. On one hand, it is not clear why some items cannot be carried on board, with the regula-
tion on the transportation of liquids in one’s hand luggage uniformly mentioned as particular-
ly bothersome. On the other, those interviewees who experienced first hand inaccuracies in 
how checks are carried out openly question whether security control delivers.  
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 I find them [security checks and regulations] quite random, because they don’t really 
check… they check that I am not carrying any weapons but actually sometimes I had 
the feeling that I could carry a weapon and the weapon would go unnoticed. I don’t 
feel extremely secure about the efficiency of the control. Because myself, I have intro-
duced sometimes liquids or things that are forbidden and they were not properly 
checked. Like small liquids, or sometimes I had scissors with me that were not detect-
ed. Especially when I am carrying the full carry-on luggage, that is bigger, sometimes 
I have forgotten that I have scissors in my vanity case and they went through. (Inter-
viewee 6) 
[Security at Brussels airport is] Poor. Maybe it’s my impression with security in gen-
eral. It’s that I find it… it’s being done because it has to be done. It doesn’t make me 
feel more secure, let’s put it this way. Because I don’t see that there is consistency, ei-
ther within the airport or between European airports, to take a measurable compari-
son. I have been able to go through with a bottle of water in an airport and not in an-
other… (Interviewee 4) 
I have had issues myself. Only once there was an issue regarding a mosquito liquid, 
for a trip to Africa. I was allowed to go through the checks once, but it’s a liquid that I 
think can cause irritation and therefore it’s not allowed to be boarded with passen-
gers. On the first check it went through, then the flight was delayed and we were taken 
out and once I went back in, actually this time it was confiscated. So the whole issue 
was about me dying of malaria in Africa. (Interviewee 3) 
They once took a nail file from me and I don’t care. The weird thing is, I had been on 
five flights with that same file and they took it right before I got on the last plane, 
which… I didn’t care. I can get another file. (…) What bothers me is that apparently it 
could be a threat and they never took it, so that means that they are not always as 
strict as they should be, or maybe on the other hand there was this one guy that was 
too serious about it. That made me feel less secure, knowing that the rules can be ap-
plied in different ways. (…) It gave me the impression that rules can be random some-
times, and that would simply surprise me and that makes me think that other rules are 
maybe too much, like the water for example. (Interviewee 2) 
The implication that arises from this is the need for more information, in the double meaning 
of providing people clear details about what they can and cannot take on board with them, and 
as a key to increased participation of passengers in the making of security. The lack of clear 
information on objects allowed as part of one’s carry on means that it is hard for the passen-
ger to know what the expected behaviour at the lane is, which makes it harder to prepare be-
forehand and the whole process more time consuming.  
 
In Brussels there are no systematic rules that are explained in a proper way. (…) Like, 
if you need to take off your shoes or do not need to take off your shoes, if you can keep 
your laptop in the laptop sleeve or you can’t. The information is there, displayed, but 
the approach changes. (Interviewee 6) 
The information is not clear enough. I would improve that by sending that infor-
mation… More and more people are booking online, and I get my e-ticket also online, 
and now they start doing that, I booked a ticket last week and I got a list of to dos and 
not to dos with regard to luggage, but it’s too long. It should be small, short, visual. 
(…) It should be put in a very easy, visual way. (Interviewee 1). 
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 At the same time, not knowing exactly why specific rules are in place and what their actual 
effect on security levels is, is seen as negatively affecting the willing participation of passen-
gers to the checks, particularly when it comes to the much despised regulation on liquids.  
 
I think if people felt that their contribution to security makes people feel safer, they 
would be much more helpful. Lots of people are getting annoyed by, for example, hav-
ing to put everything in a transparent bag and not taking water… If they don’t feel 
that that actually contributes to security. (…) If people could see [statistics], then they 
would realize that this actually makes sense, to take off your shoes, not to take water. 
Because now, once in a while, you hear a rumour, like that they are going to lift the 
ban on liquids, so where does this come from? Is it based on measurables or is it be-
cause they feel it is costing too much money? This kind of things. (Interviewee 4). 
 
Proportionality (Legitimate measure?). This last passage opens the door to a further series 
of considerations centred on the idea of the proportionality (legitimate measure?) of security 
to the threat being addressed and the risk posed by specific situations and items. Some of the 
interviewees saw this as a way of questioning whether the effort, time and money spent on 
security are justified, while others emphasized the negative implications in terms of unpleas-
antness, intimidation, suspicion and discrimination.  
 
I would leave airports like bus stations and train stations. Completely open. For me. 
Because I think it would be more efficient in the end and the risks would not be so ele-
vated. (…) I think it’s a big effort for the results that it gets. (Interviewee 6) 
I still wonder if [security practices] are necessary or not. I understand that some se-
curity is needed, but are we still in danger, or something might happen? Because I 
don’t think that shoes can be a danger, or water can be a danger. (Interviewee 10) 
I think this 100 ml rule is completely ridiculous. (…) Because if you really wanted to 
do something, you would find another way. This is ridiculous. (Interviewee 9) 
At the end of the day, I think, if the idea is to combat terrorism, no matter what the re-
strictions are, I think people are going to find a way, because I don’t honestly believe 
that for the time, and money, and effort, and wasted bottles of water… I don’t think 
it’s going to deter people, that it is going to avoid, prevent, anything from happening. 
(Interviewee 7) 
The interviews take this line of reasoning in two different directions. On one hand, the illuso-
ry nature of total security is explicitly argued, because no matter how stringent measures can 
get, something or someone is always going to slip through.  
 
That’s just impossible. The rules have gone so far that you can’t take a bottle of water 
with you, because it might be a bomb. If the rules have to go that far, I think it’s im-
possible to have total control. (…) There’s a fallacy to believe that total security is 
possible, anyway. They might take out a couple of bad guys, but then again….   I guess 
they catch a lot of drugs trafficking, or something like that, false passports, those 
things. (…) But that’s not airport security, that’s customs, right? So it’s a different 
thing. (Interviewee 2) 
At the same time, though, the potential for reassurance of security control is also acknowl-
edged, particularly for those who might find flying scary and stressful. Under this light, ac-
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 ceptance is more easily given, though this is coupled with persistent doubts as to the actual 
efficacy of security procedures.  
 
I know it has to be done to avoid possible problems, but also to show people that you 
are doing something. Because people get very scared of travelling and this kind of 
things seem to happen more on planes. So this is also a way of calming down your 
travellers. So I can accept that it’s a system to provide more security and I don’t mind 
going through it. (Interviewee 9) 
- [The rationale of security measures is] Maybe to give passengers a safe feeling, too. 
Because it might have that effect. Since the thing with the [nail] file, I have decided 
that people can still slip through with anything that can kill someone. You can kill 
someone in various ways. It might give you a false sense of security. 
- Is that a bad thing? 
- Of course not. A feeling of security is positive, unless it’s crazily overstated. 
(Interviewee 2) 
One of the elements that concerned the researchers from the very beginning of the fieldwork 
was the unbalanced nature of the relationship between screeners and passengers, and how this 
power differential might impact on people’s behaviour during security control. In order to 
address this issue, we asked interviewees whether they had ever witnessed a confrontation 
taking place between a screener and passenger, whether they had ever had one, and finally, if 
they would feel comfortable in speaking up to security personnel, should they feel they were 
somehow being mistreated. While interviewees were split in half as to whether they would 
feel comfortable in speaking up to a screener, none recalled being either a witness to an argu-
ment and only one said she had complained during security control, which means that, even 
for those who would talk back, this has so far largely remained a hypothetical scenario.  
 
- I would speak up, but there are some consequences. If you are running late for your 
flight, I don’t think it’s a good idea because it can steal time to your connection, or 
whatever. I have spoken up several times, mostly about attitude and about tone and 
about the clarity of the information.  
- And what happened to you? 
- Not much. As I said, they keep talking to you, they maybe ask you to go aside, ex-
plain, and then you might lose your place in the queue, or they might check you more 
carefully. Open your luggage fully. 
(Interviewee 6) 
I think I would [speak up]. Kindly, I think everyone can argue if something is not right 
in the way in which they are treating you. I don’t feel scared about saying what I 
think. (Interviewee 5) 
I would tell them [security agents], especially in Zaventem because I’m in my country 
so it’s easier, I think. They should follow the law that I know better. (Interviewee 8) 
If I felt that [the search] is very intimidating and that it’s going over the top, I would 
[speak up]. But it hasn’t come that. If it did, I would certainly speak up. (Interviewee 
4) 
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 It’s difficult. Hypothetically, I’d like to think that yes. But knowing myself probably 
not. It’s kind of hard to say in the abstract. I guess I would if I really felt a boundary 
had been crossed. (Interviewee 7) 
On the opposite side, others were not as certain they would speak up, mentioning the intimi-
dating nature of the screening process and explicitly saying they would be afraid such behav-
iour might result in further problems, delays and, ultimately, missing one’s flight.  
 
They are very intimidating. I feel like security in airports is a very serious something. 
(…) I am not sure if I would speak up to them. Right now, I’ll say ‘yes, I would’, but 
on the spot I am not so sure that I would. (…) I’m not afraid of the consequences. I 
think, I am sure, that there is some sort of law that protects me at that point. But may-
be in the exact situation I would not be as self-assured because the situation is intimi-
dating to me as a passenger. (Interviewee 2) 
I might ask questions, but at the same time there is idea of authority and you have to 
comply because otherwise they might delay you and you could miss your flight. Rather 
than deal with it, I’d rather say ‘whatever’ and go. (Interviewee 9) 
Some of the interviewees explicitly talked about the discomfort and intimidation experienced 
when going through security.  
 
I think [security] shouldn’t make you uncomfortable. Intimidate you. (…)  I got used to 
it, now it’s a practice, but I feel much more comfortable taking the train, or a bus, and 
I find it as secure as taking a plane. (Interviewee 6) 
It’s like they assume that you might be a danger and that’s what annoys me. They 
don’t start with the assumption that you are innocent, at least that’s the feeling I have. 
And that’s where I feel that it’s going too deep. (Interviewee 4) 
However, the possibility of being a victim of discrimination was only acknowledged sporadi-
cally, and in both cases it was mentioned as someone that the interviewees find problematic in 
the abstract, rather than something that they had been the victims of.  
 
- I would draw the line in being more unreasonably treated than other people, like be-
ing the one that is picked out all the time, or having to undergo more than other peo-
ple.  
- Has that ever been the case for you? 
- No. I’m white, I’m Belgian, I’m blond. I look very trustworthy. 
(Interviewee 8) 
…Anything that targets particular groups or individuals, for instance. You have a long 
beard and you are an Islamic man wearing a tunic, therefore you require more rigor-
ous investigation than the white girl in jumper and jeans next to you. I guess, anything 
that discriminates on outward appearances, unless you have concrete grounds to be-
lieve on basis of data that comes up on a security check, that an individual poses a 
particular risk, anything that discriminates on grounds of appearances. (Interviewee 
7) 
4.2.3 Privacy and choice 
One of the goals of PRISMS is to shed light on whether and how people understand the rela-
tionship between security and privacy (in terms of a “trade off” or differently), so in the inter-
views particular attention was paid to any mention of privacy  by the respondents. However, 
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 we decided not to ask specific questions about privacy, because this might result in biased 
answers and, consequently, unreliable data, but rather to allow the conversation to follow its 
course. In addition to being a more solid decision methodologically, this opened the door to 
the observation that for most of the interviewees privacy is not stated as such an issue. If sup-
ported by survey results, this could mean that the relationship between security and privacy is 
not a trade off, indeed, because the former displaces the latter completely. Of the three inter-
viewees that mentioned privacy explicitly, one formulated the idea that if you have nothing to 
hide, then privacy automatically becomes a non-issue. The others, though more critical in 
their approach, acknowledged that it is harder and harder to maintain a firm stance in terms of 
privacy if you want to catch a flight.  
 
- I don’t mind if someone opens my bag, I am more fed up when I have to take my lap-
top out of my bag, because sometimes you are in a rush and you have already packed 
and everything is fine the way it is and you have to open and take things out of your 
bag. 
- So you don’t feel concerned about privacy? 
- Not really. Because they are doing their job, so if they are going to check me, to 
touch me, my body, to see if there is something hidden on myself, it’s part of the job. 
They have to. If they have to open my bag, when I am travelling normally I don’t have 
dead bodies in my luggage, it’s just clothes and papers. 
(Interviewee 10) 
It’s always annoying to pass security. I don’t like the body scanner, though it hap-
pened to me that they used it in some airports in which I was. In general I don’t want 
that security practices are too invasive in terms of personal privacy. I don’t want to be 
searched if it’s not necessary, I don’t want them to need to scan my body if it’s not 
necessary. But I know that if you want to fly, it’s just part of the game. (Interviewee 5)  
- The privacy issue [is what concerns me the most]. They get to check whatever you 
take, they know who you are, they want to…. I know that in other airports more and 
more they scan your iris, you have to give fingerprints. In Schiphol recently I got this 
body scan and that I find very uncomfortable to do (…) 
- And how do you protect your privacy when you have to go through security? 
- There’s not much you can do. You have to follow the rules, you have to listen other-
wise you don’t get on a plane. So I don’t really do anything, I just obey. 
(Interviewee 8) 
However, if we widen the scope of the analysis to include elements beyond any explicit men-
tion of privacy, an interesting, and related, issue comes to the fore: choice, or, better, the lack 
thereof.  
 
I don’t like the fact that my passport now has an electronic chip. I don’t like the idea 
of biometric data. I guess I have more of a problem with the idea of the data being 
collected and passing through a scanner, even the other kind where you just pass 
through, but nothing is recorded and it is not linked directly to my identity. (…). What 
I really dislike is the idea that there is a big database and they are collecting data and 
they know all my movements. (…) 
- Can you choose whether to get a biometric passport? 
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 - That’s a good question. I am assuming no, or that it’s not obviously indicated at 
least, because I now have one and I am pretty sure had there been the option I would 
have chosen not to. 
(Interviewee 7) 
[Interviewee is talking about the body scanner she had to go through on a recent trip 
to Asia]: I feel like I don’t really have a choice. Well, apparently, I do have a choice 
but I didn’t know. You are allowed to say no, but then they will have to pat me down. 
(…) So the metal detector is fine, but the body scanner I find too intrusive.  
 
 
4.3 SCREENERS ON CHECKING PASSENGERS 
 
4.3.1 Security as a profession and the importance of routine 
 
At Brussels airport screeners are organized on passenger’s security lanes in a “rotating” team. 
Every 20 min they change position on the line. That way all personnel on the line “learns” 
how to carry out the different tasks that as a whole constitute the passengers’ security check: 
from the sorting of passengers at the beginning of the line, up until the possible manual body 
search at the end of the security check line. All interviewed screeners stressed that doing pas-
sengers’ security check, and especially the body search, becomes a professional routine. At 
first, all our respondents spoke about their job as “in the books”. Acquiring the professional 
culture can be considered as important as acquiring the necessary professional skills to per-
form the job. Screeners describe their job as “what we do is about security”, “about to guar-
antee passengers a safe flight”, etc.  Some respondents specified that the job is about giving 
passengers a feeling of security and of a safe flight. Comparing it to a respondents’ own expe-
rience in Egypt, an interviewee stated that “people have to get the feeling of, well, here we 
were thoroughly checked, and here we will get safe to our destination” (R8)  
 
Providing security and, therefore, checking passengers is the respondents’ job. Although most 
respondents recognize that conflicts can emerge from what screeners have to do in practice 
(as for example verify luggage), they all refer to the necessary, inevitable and evident charac-
ter of their interventions. The admitted intrusive practices, such as the body search or the 
checking of hand luggage, are “part of the job”. During their theoretical training (before they 
start the job) as well as during the training “on the job” they learn to interiorize this discourse 
entirely: they are part of a whole in which this moment of security check is self-evident and 
unavoidable.   
 
When listening to the respondents talking about their work, several sources of stress become 
apparent. One of those is the flow of passengers and its fluidity. Interestingly, commercial and 
security goals meet in the performance indicator expressed by the waiting time of passengers 
before the security procedure, which should be as short as possible. Almost all respondents 
referred to this criterion as setting a certain pressure on their work.  
 
“The tempo is set by the waiting time for passengers. It depends a lot on how many 
luggage passengers carry and how many bags we have to check. The waiting time is 
set at 12 min average.” (R 1)  
Second, and related source of stress are the “quality control experiments”. Several respond-
ents pointed out that the department of quality control (part of the Brussels airport security 
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 division) send out “actors” that do effectively carry security sensible material and try to get 
those through the lines, in order to put the screeners to test. The use of such practical tests was 
also reported to us during the interviews we had with the members of the quality control divi-
sion of Brussels Airport. The sheer possible existence of such anonymous and fake carriers of 
security sensible things that test screeners in regards of their the accuracy indeed creates pres-
sure.  
 
 “You have the test coming through of Brussels Airport, which causes some stress es-
pecially for the screeners, (…) you know trail subjects who carry a knife between their 
breasts or in their belt or a package in luggage, and you have to detect them, and that 
are really not so evidently detectable things (…) and you miss it … everybody has had 
a test package getting through” (R13) 
Of course, the screeners have the task, if not “duty”, to “catch” the quality control agents dis-
guised in bad passengers, and that generates a constant pressure sharpening vigilance and sus-
picion, since next to the  “real” security risks that can be deemed to be exceptional, they have 
to also envision recurrent staged risks. This kind of quality control tactics has in fact perma-
nent effects, since every passenger can be a fake passenger; such a possibility impacts screen-
ers in a permanent and persistent way. However, and ambiguously, this pressure brings our 
respondents to voice that there is at any rate no such thing as a 100 % effective security 
check: they firmly state that neither personnel nor technology, nor their conjunction, can (ev-
er) guarantee a zero-risk result. The technological devices used are not error free or 100 % 
reliable.  
 
“Computers make mistakes, the human factor is important … computers functions 
well up until the moment there is a malfunction or interruption” (R11)  
“When you work here, you know that 100 % security does not exist. Then you learn 
that there are possibilities, but they are here at the security screening of passengers” 
(R13) 
However, this “realistic” view upon their role, capabilities and work is of course not com-
pletely in line with the security driven discourse of their company and Brussels Airport man-
agement.  
 
A lot of respondents pointed out that the first body search they had to perform was an awk-
ward and confronting experience. It is the security logic linked to the job that however will 
eventually result in a “normalisation” of these everyday practices in the discourse of screen-
ers. Pursuant, it is interesting to note that screeners also explicitly indicate that these searches 
gradually become less awkward, because, after the first experiences, the people they have to 
search become more and more “strangers” to them. Somehow, by “depersonalising” passen-
gers that have to be checked, the screeners “accept” more easily that the intrusive character of 
what they do is an essential and a so-called inevitable part of their job. Professionalism, au-
tomatism, habit and routine contribute to this evolution.    
 
 “It becomes a routine, (..) you don’t see anymore who you are searching, (…) in fact 
you don’t really look at people who they are, even with friends, may be that is bizarre 
for them, but for me they are just a passenger” (R13) 
Some screeners explicitly refer to situations wherein relatives or friends would have to be 
checked as “impossible” or “awkward”. When the face returns, searching the body becomes 
difficult again.  
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 “It would be awkward for me if it were one of my friends (…) if you know the people 
then it would be difficult” (R5) 
The security practices are clearly and obviously crossing the limits of the passengers’ “priva-
cy”, and the interviewees are well aware of this. On the other hand, the every day routine of 
the security line, the changing positions and tasks, the learning on the job, the quality control 
testing, all these factors enhance the normalization of the procedures that screeners the also 
experience as intrusive (for the passengers as well as for themselves).  
 
An important effect of this normalization can be detected in the way the screeners explain 
how they react when faced to conflicts with passengers. Almost all of our respondents stated 
that in these cases passengers are “reacting against the uniform” not against the individual. 
Anything a passenger would or could say is to be considered by the screeners as being “non-
personal”. In these narratives we can detect the importance (and impact) of the training on the 
job. Training on the job is a way of practical learning, enabling more easily the interiorising 
of a professional discourse. Precisely this interiorisation is an important step in the process of 
socialisation into a professional culture, here of security professions. But an important para-
dox of the studied situation remains: on the one hand screeners are taught to and have to treat 
passengers as clients, while, on the other, they per se communicate a suspicion and distrust 
towards the same clients.  
 
 
4.3.2 Security screening and the submission of passengers 
 
All interviewed screeners are aware of the tension embedded in their work, which relates to 
the intrusion into passengers privacy in a very direct and concrete way. According to them, 
however, passengers have been given a choice, and by being there at the airport at the security 
lanes, this choice is unambiguously expressed.  
 
 “Some people don’t like that and they (…) take the train or the boat. Here (at the air-
port) you know that you will be confronted with this (security screening). In principle 
they can’t refuse.” (R1) 
Screeners act as if the passenger’s consent has already been given and the privacy-security 
trade-off has already been settled at the moment and by the buying an airplane ticket. The 
security check of passengers the appears as a self-evident consequence of an already made 
choice. Screeners perceive the security screening of passengers as part of airport mobility. 
There are no choices, alternatives available or discussions possible. Illustrative of this view is 
the rationalisation of one of our interviewees who affirmed that “passengers give us the per-
mission of checking their luggage, because they hand it over at the beginning of the line” 
(R12). The situation is clear and straightforward for interviewed screeners. It is a fait accom-
pli, as many interviewees explicitly phrase: “people have to submit to it, it is my job” (R11). 
Therefore, the practice of passengers’ security checks is, according to the screeners, in fact no 
longer and thus not a “trade-off” situation an sich, because there are no options or alternatives 
that can be considered and/or explained. If people want to fly, there is no way around the se-
curity practices as they are organised today.   
 
Henceforth, it is not surprising that the screeners are surprised and even turn slightly irritated 
when confronted to what might be described as airport security stupidity or dementia  
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  “people that don’t know the rules or just don’t understand why some things cannot 
pass, which is bizarre because it is written everywhere” (R12) 
“we call this airport dementia; people arrive and they forget everything.. it really is 
remarkable, the tourists, they arrive and they forget, or they don’t listen” (R9) 
As observed and described for courtroom practices, such “stupidity” refers to the fact that 
citizens (passengers) are not capable of participation because they don’t know or cannot un-
derstand the rules.11 This creates a situation wherein professionals (screeners in this case) are 
left to lead “the game”. This perception of (some) passengers as not “adequate” makes even 
more visible the dominance of security rules and measures, and its mirror, the expected sub-
mission of travellers.  
 
 
4.3.3 Passengers: the good, the old and the different 
 
Some passengers are considered to be difficult. Screeners mobilise all kind of criteria to cate-
gorise passengers. Based on the interviews, there is obviously a clear line between “good” 
(easy) and more “difficult” passengers: many screeners at Brussels airport consider regular 
and experienced travellers, as embodied by the “business passengers”, as the “good” ones, the 
examples. The perfect passenger is the traveller who knows “the game” and voluntarily plays 
by its rules: such a doesn’t need any explanation, guideline or directive on how to proceed, 
(s)he just does what (s)he’s expected to do.  
 
“Business people know what they have to do” (R5) 
They too have interiorised the features and routines of the security line; they anticipate by taking off of 
their shoes, watches and belts, laying out laptop and other devices, showing liquids in plastic bags, etc. 
The perfect passenger doesn’t speak up, submits fully and complacently, and expects to get through 
fluidly. “Easy” passengers aim at getting through the security check swiftly an as fast as is possible.  
 
 “When they beep, they want you to do the manual body search immediately without 
too much tralala” (R2)  
Moreover, priority-screening lanes are provided so that “good clients” can get through faster 
(together with airport personnel). This special screening lane is accessible depending on the 
type of ticket you bought. Access priority security lanes is a (commercial) privilege given to 
some clients in function of the sort of ticket they bought or as a result of promotional activi-
ties of carriers.  
 
In the eyes of the screeners, the more difficult passengers are first time flyers, older people 
and/or passengers from a “different” culture and/or religion, including indeed, problems of 
language or and clothing habits.  
 
 “Well those Moroccan men, in their culture women are beneath them, but here in this 
situation they have women giving them orders, sometimes they just ignore my col-
league, they just look at me, well I tell them then that my colleague is talking to them 
(...) With the Jews it is just as well, women have nothing to say” (R11) 
“Passengers behave that way because of the stress of travelling, starting at home, 
leaving in time, and getting to the gate” (R11) 
                                                
11 Carlen, Pat, Magistrates' Justice, Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1974. 
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 Also considered difficult are passengers who speak up, making jokes or ironic remarks as a 
way of express their recalcitrance towards the procedure, or their unhappiness with the situa-
tion. Some respondents reported that passengers also do put them to test:  
 
 “Passengers that are not paying attention, they are already on holiday, you ask some-
thing and they say no, but then it is yes (about liquids for example) … but some do it 
on purpose, and say then: oh yes I just wanted to see if you were going to detect it, or 
they say: oh I just wanted to try it; and then you think hello we are not plying a game 
here?” (R11) 
Some interviewees said they could “feel” immediately when looking at the waiting line if the 
next passenger would be a difficult one or not.  
 
 “at the beginning of the line you can already see it … if he is already sighing (…) 
then it can become difficult if we have to take something out” (R 1) 
”you can see it immediately by the way of doing, making faces, «oei oei oei», rolling 
with their eyes, body language and expressions of faces, (…) well that will not be a 
simple client to handle” (R11).  
Most screeners attribute the difficulties with a passenger to the latter’s personality, the mo-
ment of the day, the stress of travelling, and the pressure to be on time at the gate … 
 
Even some “good” business passengers can turn into “difficult” ones, be it only because “as 
they travel very regularly, every day, they don’t understand why they have to be checked each 
time” (R10).  
 
One of our respondents also explained how the random selection of passengers going through 
the “metal detection gates” sometimes causes hostile reactions from precisely these passen-
gers; then, the complying and submitting passengers get angry because their complying and 
submissive behaviour is not paying off. They are suddenly under suspicion, which they con-
sider as totally absurd, precisely because they play the game of self-disclosure12, but get nev-
ertheless picked out.  
 
Furthermore, passengers become difficult when they try to discuss the rules of security that 
are announced or applied. As known, these rules mainly concern goods that cannot be taken 
on the plane, with the bottle of water as the most emblematic example. Even if some rules are 
considered exaggerated or even unnecessary by our respondents, all of them stressed that 
there is no room at all for discussion about their application in the line.   
 
 “Those rules were once established, and I admit 100% that a lot of these things are 
pointless, euh what do I say, that rule about the water and those things, … but, it is the 
rule, people don’t know anymore why they were introduced” (R13) 
Based on our observations, it strongly appears that the primary attitude of screeners is always 
to “stand by the rules”, to avoid any discussion.  
 
 “We don’t go into discussion” (R5) 
                                                
12 Salter, 2007. 
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 “you don’t explain … point (…) because sometimes there are passengers that ask, 
‘well yes can I see that on paper?’ … Then you get the police inspector, who then can 
explain it” (R2) 
“With the bottle of water, you just have to say to the people that the procedure is what 
it is, but you cannot question your own procedures” (R3) 
“They know that it can be taken from them (..) compare it to speeding: you know you 
can only drive 120 km/h … so if you speed up to a 140 km/h … (R2) 
“You cannot explain to passengers why some things are prohibited. We are not al-
lowed to do it. We cannot explain why some things are dangerous or what can be done 
with it. We can only say that the law says (that it is not allowed) and that is it” (R12) 
If no discussion is possible or allowed for security agents, they are nevertheless constantly 
confronted with such discussions, which produces quiet some stress and frustration, according 
to some respondents:  
 
 “Passengers that don’t appreciate what we are doing here, (that is giving stress): 
(they say) come on there is no harm in me taking this, why can I not take this with me. 
And then by the end of the day you have this feeling of hello, do you still not under-
stand for what we are standing here? (…) That is sometimes frustrating that people 
don’t appreciate what we are doing” (R12) 
An important part of the interaction between screeners and passengers is precisely about the 
rules, their legitimacy, and how they are applied. The result of such verbal exchanges is com-
parable to the “Little Britain” sketch: Computer says no! ... In general, screeners refuse to 
enter into these discussions by giving the message that “the rules are the rules, and we just 
have to apply them, we don’t make the rules”. In almost all our interviews this sort of purely 
executive attitude was present. This way the practice of screening passengers is presented as 
neutral and exclusively technical: the security agents are not responsible for what they do. 
Discussions about the policies defining the situation and the set regulatory framework that 
governs it (as for example the “no liquids rule”) are neutralised and cut short by reference to a 
higher authority that is not present, invisible or anonymous, but that justifies and legalizes 
nevertheless. The balance of power and dominance at play cannot be discussed neither hu-
moured nor laughed at: it is a given, not only for the passengers but also for its executioners. 
But, as we will see, the submission of passengers to the situation of security screening (and its 
rules) is not naturally given or as self-evident and unproblematic as such representations as-
sume.  
 
4.3.4 Doing security and privacy: Testing the limits 
 
It appears from the interviews with the screeners that the (strict or blind) application of “the 
rules” is effectively a source of conflicts. Therefore, it remains remarkable that in the specific 
situation of the security screening, almost no explanation is given to passengers about the 
character, reason or origin of the rules at stake. However, during the interviews, the screeners 
also declared that when this discussion is getting out of hand, they have to call in a superior (a 
police inspector), who, contrary to them, then might decide not to apply the rule (of the bottle 
of water, or baby food, food, make up, etc … ) !  
 
 “And this is frustrating for us, because for some it can pass and for others it is not al-
lowed”(R11).  
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 Conflicts do emerge during the practice of the screening of passengers. And such conflicts are 
interesting events for our research, because they embody and can be understood as “petty acts 
of resistance”13 and hence, illustrate and point at the discussion that can exist about the rules 
and the way they are applied. Scott’s perspective on relations of dominance (which is em-
blematically the case at the airport’s security lines) is that these conflicts are an expression of 
a constant testing of the limits of domination and its public transcript14: “A clear view of the 
‘micro’ pushing and shoving involved in power relations, and particularly power relations in 
which appropriation and permanent subordination are central, makes any static view of natu-
ralisation and legitimation untenable” 15. Hence, it is precisely through these conflicts, as 
small as they may be, that the public transcript of relation of power is tested at its limits and 
expresses the “hidden transcript”. This draws our attention towards small forms of resistance 
to the security logic, its implementation and the invoked trade-off, which are made visible 
through the conflicts. All interviewed screeners described, recognised and explained daily 
conflicts with passengers as related to a sort of resistance to the expected (complete) subordi-
nation to the rules driving these security practices. Again, it has nothing to do with them per-
sonally:  
 
 “The react to my uniform … you don’t have to take it personally, they are angry at 
my uniform, not at me” (R11).  
“You don’t have to take that personal, passengers react on something that is our job, 
they don’t react on me” (R1) 
This illustrates not only that screeners have to deal passively with the resistance of passen-
gers, but also that this behaviour is precisely about “the system and its rules”. Consequently, 
screeners become aware of how the security logic and its devices are experienced by passen-
gers. It shows them (and us) that there are limits to the acceptance and submission of passen-
gers and, via small frictions and sparks, where these limits lay and where submission turns 
into recalcitrance and resistance, how subtle and muffled it might be .  
 
The “bottle of water” and the “no liquids” rule, seen as the main source of conflicts, provide 
an interesting example.  
 
A lot of passengers are speaking up when they have to leave behind their bottle of water. Sev-
eral interviewees reported this conflict, referring to passengers telling them that their water is 
no risk (!) and proving it by drinking from the bottle. Interviewees did report that passengers 
were angry about the injustice of taking their bottle away and implicitly obliging them to buy 
an (very) expensive new one in the commercial area beyond the security check. Some screen-
ers mentioned more humoristic passengers that provoke screeners by offering them a drink … 
Most interesting is that our respondents could understand these passengers about the no liq-
uids rule, especially when considering the bottle of water. But, they immediately add that 
even then the matter cannot even be discussed with passengers, because that would not only 
delegitimize that one rule, but the entire security check before the gates (sic).  
 
The bottle of water is emblematic of the “hidden transcript”, the limits of acceptability and 
dominance. When obliged to leave behind small bottles of shampoo, cream or other liquids, 
passengers “growl” and “counter” by accusing security agents of “stealing” their goods. In the 
interviews screeners explained that all taken goods (liquids) are confiscated and will be de-
                                                
13 Scott, 1990. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., p. 197 
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 stroyed; they also stated that they more or less ignore such comments, not to antagonise the 
passenger, and remain friendly and professional (“It’s the uniform”).  
 
But the sources of conflict go beyond the no-liquid rule, and certainly do also involve issues 
related to the passengers’ experience of their privacy. It is precisely by way of these conflicts 
that security agents are confronted with privacy-limits of passengers related to their job on the 
security line. Two other sources of conflicts are very common and illustrative of passengers’ 
experience of privacy. A first one concerns the opening and searching of hand luggage. When 
a piece of hand luggage is “screened” by the machine and the visioning on the monitor by a 
screener reveals a doubt or a suspicious object, it is taken apart as “a risk” in order to be man-
ually checked. Screeners are well aware that this is an interference with the private sphere of 
citizens and they all confirm and accept that the search of hand luggage should be performed 
in a discrete way. All interviewees have accounted for situations that seemed delicate or 
awkward for the concerned passenger. In general this has to do with certain items present in 
their bag (underwear, intimate toys, .. .etc) which might been exposed  publicly, especially to 
the view of fellow travellers standing beside and able to peak in.  
 
 “yes, that depends on the sort of passenger that you got. Sometimes you find weird 
things, that I am not going to name … but once I found a burial urn“(R7). 
“There was a girl that started crying because her colleague stood next to her and had 
seen her underwear” (R1) 
“Sometimes this is embarrassing, for example when a men searching a women’s lug-
gage” (R11) 
The interviews show how rationalisation helps neutralising these “awkward” or unsettling 
situations. Some respondents say they have to ask the passenger explicitly for the permission 
of searching their bag, but none of them does even consider that passengers would deny them 
access. In fact, in their eyes, the checking of the luggage is “granted” by the passenger. Some 
screeners also refer to the fact that  
 
 “They give their luggage to us, and that is also how we learned it, they give their lug-
gage for control, so from that moment on they give permission and say in fact that you 
are allowed to control my luggage”(R12). 
But, screeners also report that passengers become annoyed and angry after their luggage is 
searched and it is left to them to rearrange it. Many of our respondents have experienced con-
flicts with their client- passengers over this issue. Passengers do speak up to screeners when 
they are left with their luggage all turned upside down. This attitude illustrates that the in-
volved passenger feels treated unjustly with suspicion, and therefore security agents should 
take responsibility for that “act”. Interviewed screeners understand and sometimes agree, but 
they explain (in the interviews and to the passengers) that they are not allowed (by their com-
pany) to repack the searched bag. Here the employer is the higher authority.  
 
Last but not least, and certainly not in an unexpected way, are the reactions upon the manual 
body search. As said above, all respondents pick out this part of the screening as a most deli-
cate one, which easily leads to conflicts. Screeners say they are, of course, aware of the inti-
mate character of the body search: it is undoubtedly invasive to touch the body of another 
person.  
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  “I found it difficult at the beginning, because there you enter really a personal zone. 
(…) There was this women who agreed that I did a manual body search, but she re-
peated all the time that I couldn’t touch her, yes well (…), finally I had to do the man-
ual search” (R12) 
As a matter of fact, passengers sometimes emotionally react to the way agents perform the 
body search. In the interviews screeners, in compensation, express the feeling or suggest that 
some passengers overreact. In addition to the privacy aspect conflicts about the body search 
do also refer to the issue of fair treatment. As in many domains of government activity  (crime 
fighting and prosecution, …) public trust and institutional legitimacy are (also) based on a fair 
and respectful treatment and its experience as such by the “subjects”, and this will affect 
compliance and cooperation negatively or positively.16 Most agents state explicitly that the 
body search is more easily and acceptably performed, because passengers are “strangers” to 
them,  
 
 “if it would be people that you know, that would be difficult” (R5) 
Passengers are treated as anonymous objects, which creates a “distance” between the involved 
participants. This neutralises, so the screeners say, the privacy sensitive character of the body 
search. This is confirmed a contrario, by the fact that most respondents point out that search-
ing members of their family or friends on the body would be rather difficult or awkward:  
 
 “I am not going to manually search my own mother …. Yes we are allowed to do that, 
but I have decided for my self that I don’t check my own family. You are working in 
security, and I think that you don’t check your own family as thoroughly as others. 
People that I don’t know, or colleagues, no problem, but when it comes to family, I 
don’t know (…) then it becomes more personal“(R12) 
The manual body search is a very sensitive part of the security screening. Passengers also feel 
and voice that this makes clear they are considered as suspects, and make remarks such as 
“Do you think I am a terrorist” (R7).  
 
From the interviews with screeners it seems that the way participants (screeners and passen-
gers) interact is a potential source of conflict. Almost all interviewed screeners stressed the 
importance of staying calm and friendly:  
 
 “If you are friendly yourself, (..) it’s a style of working, (that is important, … as in a 
shop, the same principle applies here, it works well, (…) if you stay calm and friendly, 
that you have less conflicts” (R5) 
“but if I look at some colleagues they are can be very uptight, being irritated by for-
eign passengers, if you don’t treat passengers in a correct way, you should not be sur-
prised that they react. You have to be friendly and respectful, even a bit of laughing 
can help” (R13)  
On the one hand passengers have to submit and keep jokes about the situation of the screening 
for them. Humour and relativisation are ‘not done’ when interacting with security agents.  
 
 “People who want to be funny (..) ah I have a bomb with me … Well that is not funny 
in the context of an airport. These jokes can be fined, you bring in the inspector, … yes 
                                                
16 Hough, Mike, Jonathan Jackson, Ben Radford, et al., "Procedural justice, trust and institutional legitimacy", 
Policing: a journal of policy and practice, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2010, pp. 203-210. 
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 but I was only joking, (…) well then we have to teach them a lesson and reprimand 
them ” (R11) 
Interviewed screeners confirm that some passengers made fun of them or of the situation, 
questioning the seriousness and/or legitimacy of the screening. But nevertheless, it is a way 
through which they voice their disagreement with security procedures towards the agents in a 
rhetorical way (such as the -during the manual body search- Do you think I am a terrorist” 
(R7)”)  
 
However, on the other hand, screeners and their way of interacting with passengers can also 
be a source of conflicts. Passengers which feel treated in an unfair, impolite or uncivil way, 
can react immediately and in a strong way. This happens when they are treated more as sus-
pects than as clients.  
 
Finally, when a conflict occurs, the screener’s rule of thumb is to immediately bring in “hier-
archy” and authority. Any agent confronted with a conflictive situation with a client has to 
call his/her superior, if he or she cannot solve the problem swiftly. Passengers are then taken 
apart with a new agent who is a superior in rank, generally recognisable because of a different 
uniform. Ultimately the airport (public) police will deal with the conflict or the “difficult” 
passenger.  
 
 “We are trained to avoid possible conflicts, and so if a situation is getting out of 
hand, we cannot continue the interaction, we have in fact not the authority – so euh we 
only are authorised to control people. From the moment a conflict escalates, we have 
to transfer the case to a superior and or directly to the airport police inspector” (R10)  
This chain of conflict solving can be described as “stubborn”: the rules are the rules at every 
hierarchical level. Of course, passengers can file a complaint, and some actually do so17. From 
our interviews it became clear that security agents don’t really know much about how com-
plaints are handled and what the result is.  
 
 “A passenger was going to introduce a complaint against me, but I never heard any-
thing about it” (R6) 
However the procedure is rather difficult, requiring time as well as accurate information (for 
example the name of the involved security agents). But at that specific moment, when a client 
has to catch his flight the endlessly repeated message is: “You accept it, otherwise you don’t 
come in …”.  
 
                                                
17 We	  were	  not	  able	  to	  obtain	  data	  of	  filed	  complains,	  the	  way	  they	  were	  treated,	  and	  the	  final	  results.	  A	  heavy	  formall	  procedure	  that	  would	  take	  too	  long	  and	  jeopardize	  the	  timing	  of	  this	  research	  task	  even	  more,	  made	  us	  decide	  to	  not	  involve	  this	  sources	  to	  our	  empirical	  data.	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 5  CONCLUSIONS: SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE AIRPORT 
SECURITY SCREENING OF PASSENGERS  
 
The results of this case-study bring us to several reflections relevant for our understanding of 
how citizens experience and evaluate security practices.   
 
1. Based on the observations, accounts of passengers and of screeners at the security-
screening line, we can conclude that there is an overall dominant security logic that re-
quires the almost absolute submission of clients-passengers. As stated before, in this situa-
tion of security screening of passengers the security-privacy trade-off has already been 
settled, in fact it is a condition of possibility for the existing of the dispositive as it exists 
on the site. Therefore, it is simply impossible for any client-passenger willing to step on 
his/her flight not to submit. By buying a ticket you are deemed and doomed to agree with 
the practices of security screening. A first reflection resulting from this small-scale re-
search is that the security screening of passengers has become seen as a “normal” and in-
tegrated part of the taking of a civil airplane. Both passengers and screeners voiced this 
conclusion. Some forms of intimidation and suspicion are thus supposed to legitimately 
drive and underpin security-screening practices in airports, even if they create some sort 
of discomfort. Consequently, it is clear that passengers’ security screening, as an everyday 
airport practice, is already far beyond an effective trade-off between security and privacy. 
The choice to be made is “to fly or not to fly”, and both passengers and screeners are 
aware of that. The security line is far beyond the trade-off between privacy and security, if 
you do not accept to be stripped of your privacy, you won’t pass the security check. An 
all-encompassing and first line “trade-off” has become part of air travel, and it implies a 
very high degree of loss at the side of privacy. The only trade off which remains at the 
line is: a trade off between returning home and pursuing your journey.  
 
2. Therefore, we can easily understand that passengers’ experience of and attitude towards 
these privacy “invasive” practice(s) is a pragmatic one. That is also the reason why they 
submit to “the game” of self-disclosure. However, this submission must not be understood 
as the acceptance of the security-privacy trade-off as such. As described above, it is on the 
contrary, “spiced” with diverse strategies and small forms of resistance, such as being or 
behaving as ignorant of the rules, being impervious, discussing the rules, speaking up to 
security agents. It is within these conflicts that their discontent with the dominant security 
logic becomes visible. The acceptance op the security line has to do with resignation in 
the face of a thing to big to contest. It is indeed easier to accept it.  
 
3. The situation of the security screening of passengers can be seen and understood as part of 
a disciplinary dispositive. By becoming a “natural” or normal part of what airport mobility 
is about, passengers are nudged and disciplined to meet the ways and ends this routine of 
security screening is aiming at. The passengers not only are physically channelled and 
constrained through a sequence of moulds (by human and technological interventions), 
but also discursively socialised and prepared to the daily practice of self-disclosure (cf. the 
confession) and made to accept that they have to prove that they are not suspects (!). You 
have to behave as demanded - to submit -, otherwise you will remain a suspect and be im-
peached to catch your flight. The normalisation of such invasive security practices refers 
directly to Salter’s analysis of the governmentalities of airports. 18 Over time the entire se-
curity process, with its different specific security measures, rules and standards, became 
                                                
18 Salter, 2007. 
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 normalised, and got considered as an integral part of some sort of package deal. At the 
moment, today, the screeners we interviewed find the body scanner too intrusive, but the 
potential for normalization (especially if supported by an implementation on a large scale) 
and people’s ability to adapt and submit should not be underestimated.   
 
4. The unsettling idea of being treated as a suspect, colours the whole experience: it is heavi-
ly present during the screening and is an important source of conflicts. The bottom line is 
that passengers have the idea that these security practices are set up for others than them-
selves. The suspects are others, and normal passengers have nothing to hide, which is a 
standard argument in the security-privacy trade-off discourse. Such implicit assumption 
refers to a mechanism that can be best compared to the criminological concept of the 
“criminal other” (Oxford Handbook of Criminological Theory, 2013: 679). Passengers 
submit willingly to the procedure because they (think they) have nothing to hide. More 
experienced passengers even cooperate by anticipation. However, it is precisely when they 
are confronted with some contested rules (cf. bottle of water) or methods (like the selec-
tion of their bag or themselves for a more specific control), they re-experience what has 
been normalised: the position of being a suspect. And that is precisely one of the limits 
where conflict emerges. Suddenly, they are confronted with the fact that they are and re-
mained, suspects, even if they have nothing to hide.  
 
5. A last and important reflection brings us to what we could call the security paradoxes. 
From our interviews with passengers, it looks like more information made available on ac-
tual threats, on the precise rationale for specific measures and on possible ‘success sto-
ries’, along with increased transparency about the decision-making process involved in es-
tablishing rules and new measures would. These evolutions are likely to increase people’s 
willingness to willingly participate in the security control procedures. However, the key 
point of the whole system is secrecy, as it is assumed that making information freely 
available would give potential terrorist an edge. Therefore, the specific situation of pas-
sengers’ security screening turns into an act that has to be performed, but is emptied of 
relevant meaning. This, coupled to the recognised illusion of total security through securi-
ty screening, brings us to an even stronger insight: the security screening of passengers is 
experienced as a quasi-theatrical and sometimes absurd performance. It has imposed itself 
as the only possible access to airplane mobility, and as an everyday routine, normalised, 
boring and a nuisance for passengers. Everybody participates (security agents and passen-
gers) pragmatically by playing the game and to reproduce the expected and chewed dis-
course when asked. Everybody knows there is no hundred percent security or a zero-risk 
airplane travel. Doubt is consequently creeping in when the meaning, necessity or useful-
ness of these practices are at hand. But then, remarkably, it works … in the sense that citi-
zens just submit to security line controls that would be met with outrage and even active 
resistance in other settings. And this is unsettling, because the recognition of the illusion 
of total security operates at the same time as the generator of more and new risks to be de-
tected and fought, leading to more security, and thus again, to more risks.  
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